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Afghanistan Halfway through 
the Transition Phase 
Shortcomings of the Security Transition and Remaining Options for NATO 
Nils Wörmer 
Progress with regard to building up Afghanistan’s National Security Forces, improving 
the governance performance of the incumbent regime, pursuing a domestic peace pro-
cess, cooperating with Afghanistan’s neighbors (particularly Pakistan and Iran), and 
creating prospects for economic development have been defined as preconditions for 
the successful transition of security responsibilities in Afghanistan. However, one and 
a half years after the security transition phase was officially launched by the Afghan 
government, NATO has been experiencing severe difficulties in the outlined fields of 
activity. US policy and NATO’s strategy toward Afghanistan seem at least partly dead-
locked. Western policymakers have few remaining options for the second half of the 
security transition in Afghanistan. These include focusing on the two key players in 
the Afghan conflict, namely strengthening the government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan and weakening the senior leadership of the Afghan Taleban. 
 
In July 2011, almost a decade after the 
Islamic Emirate of the Taleban had been 
toppled by an American-led international 
military force, NATO and the Afghan gov-
ernment launched the “security transition.” 
This process has entailed the step-by-step 
handover of security responsibilities from 
NATO to the Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF) and is being accompanied by 
the withdrawal of NATO’s combat forces. 
The “transition phase” is due to be con-
cluded by December 2014. By that point, 
Afghanistan will have regained its full 
sovereignty. The international community 
has already defined the phase that will 
follow the “transition” and named it the 
“transformation phase”, which is scheduled 
for the years 2015 to 2024. For this period, 
NATO already announced a follow-up mis-
sion to the International Security Assis-
tance Force (ISAF) without combat oper-
ations but rather a focus on training and 
advising the ANSF.  
The security transition between mid-
2011 and the end of 2014 is part of a strat-
egy of NATO and the Afghan government 
that derives from the January 2010 Inter-
national Conference in London, the July 
2010 Kabul International Conference, the 
December 2011 International Afghanistan 
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Conference in Bonn, and the NATO sum-
mits of Lisbon (2010) and Chicago (2012). 
According to repeated announcements of 
Western politicians, there are a number of 
issues that have to be dealt with in order 
for the current strategy on Afghanistan to 
succeed. These issues include: (1) the forma-
tion of Afghanistan’s security forces, par-
ticularly the Afghan National Police (ANP) 
and the Afghan National Army (ANA); (2) a 
“good governance performance” and an 
anti-corruption campaign by the Afghan 
government; (3) the domestic peace and 
reconciliation process; (4) regional cooper-
ation on the part of Afghanistan’s neigh-
boring countries, first and foremost Paki-
stan and Iran; and (5) the creation of pros-
pects for economic development. In other 
words, because progress in these areas has 
been defined as a pre-condition for reach-
ing (a) the short-term goal of transferring 
security responsibilities to Afghan author-
ities and (b) the long-term goal of perma-
nently stabilizing the country, we have to 
examine these five issues in order to assess 
whether NATO’s strategy is working or not. 
Key areas during the transition 
The build-up of the ANSF.  Throughout 
2012 NATO and the Afghan government 
managed to increase the total number of 
servicemen in the ANSF to nearly 352,000, 
which was the planned target number. 
However, it has been reported that up to 
one-third of the ANSF’s personnel have 
to be substituted annually due to combat 
losses, desertion, and attrition. This under-
mines any efforts to create internal co-
hesion in these newly formed organiza-
tions. This is being exacerbated by the fact 
that NATO already announced reductions 
to the ANSF of one-third to about 230,000 
servicemen in 2016. Furthermore, the ANSF 
are lacking a clear distinction of whom to 
fight and what to defend. According to the 
Western donors’ philosophy, the ANSF’s 
main task is to protect the Afghan con-
stitution and to fight the insurgency. How-
ever, the Afghan president, who is the 
supreme commander of the ANA – as many 
of his officers and soldiers see it – showed 
complete disregard for the constitution 
during the 2009 presidential elections and 
repeatedly referred to the supposed enemy, 
the Taleban, as “brothers.” 
Regarding the architecture of the securi-
ty sector, the Afghan state is facing further 
challenges. The three main security organi-
zations – the military, the police, and the 
intelligence service (National Directorate of 
Security, NDS) – have overlapping respon-
sibilities and have been structured, trained, 
and equipped for domestic actions against 
the insurgency. This creates a strong rivalry 
between the ANA, ANP, and NDS. 
Thus, the uncertainty of future re-
sources, the absence of a clearly defined 
enemy, as well as the structural shortcom-
ings concerning the overall architecture of 
the security sector in Afghanistan are major 
obstacles for developing an identity, in-
creasing the internal cohesion, and boost-
ing the morales of the ANA and the ANP. 
 
Governance.  Regarding the Afghan govern-
ment’s assurance of improving its gover-
nance performance and fighting corrup-
tion, the upcoming presidential elections 
(scheduled for April 5, 2014) will be a key 
indicator. After the debacle of the 2009 
presidential elections and the Kabul Bank 
corruption scandal in 2010/11 – to mention 
only two prominent examples of abuse 
of the administration – the way that the 
2014 elections are prepared and executed 
will have a decisive impact on the Afghan 
people’s trust in the country’s political 
institutions. According to the Afghan con-
stitution, Hamid Karzai, who has been the 
only president of post-Taleban Afghanistan, 
cannot run for a third term. 
 
The peace process.  The Afghan peace pro-
cess – officially launched in 2010 when 
President Karzai held a National Consulta-
tive Peace Jirga and established a High 
Peace Council (HPC) – has made little prog-
ress during the past couple of years. While 
the Afghan government (respectively the 
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HPC) was failing at initiating substantial 
negotiations between the main conflicting 
parties, the Taleban was achieving propa-
gandistic victories. They rocketed the Peace 
Jirga and assassinated the chairman of the 
HPC, former Afghan president Burhanud-
din Rabbani. 
Until today there have been no substan-
tial negotiations between the Taleban and 
the Afghan government, and there is still 
no road map for peace negotiations that 
defines topics, participants, mediators, or 
a time frame for permanent talks (see also 
SWP Comments 44/2012). 
However, the key issue regarding peace 
talks seems to be that the positions of the 
government and the Taleban leadership are 
mutually incompatible. The key demand of 
the Taleban is a complete withdrawal of all 
foreign military forces and major changes 
to the Afghan constitution. They do not 
even recognize the Karzai government as 
a negotiating party and have already an-
nounced that they will also not recognize 
the 2014 presidential elections.  
 
Cooperation with neighbors.  Beside the 
United States, Russia, China, and India, 
most notably Pakistan and Iran are the 
other key players in Afghanistan. The two 
countries will probably play a major role 
in Afghanistan after the drawdown of 
NATO’s combat forces. Related to the NATO 
strategy, a more cooperative attitude as 
well as support for the Afghan peace pro-
cess is required by Pakistan and Iran. A vital 
question that has rarely been answered is 
why they should do so. Pakistan has played 
a double game of astonishing magnitude 
with the United States and NATO for about 
a decade. Meanwhile, Iran has successfully 
implemented anti-US positions into its 
policy approaches toward Afghanistan – 
positions that are mainly driven by its own 
security needs regarding the nuclear dis-
pute. The Afghanistan policies of both 
Pakistan and Iran have included support 
for non-state military actors like the Tale-
ban, which has been highlighted in West-
ern debates for years. However, both coun-
tries have not yielded when put under high 
diplomatic and military pressure by the 
United States. It is unlikely that they will 
concede after a US military drawdown in 
the region and in the light of a possible 
failure of NATO’s Afghanistan strategy. 
 
Economic development.  A pre-condition 
for creating economic development is a 
minimum of stability and security 
throughout the country. Regarding this, 
it is meaningless whether or not NATO 
declares particular areas of Afghanistan to 
be stable and secure. The point is whether 
the Afghan people and investors perceive 
particular areas as being secure and if they 
are willing to take the risk to launch new 
enterprises there. In addition, the Afghan 
government up to now has failed to provide 
legal security for international companies 
that are interested in developing and ex-
ploiting Afghanistan’s rich deposits of 
natural resources. In 2012, an appropriate 
new mining law was rejected by the cabi-
net, which has since deferred some of the 
projects that had already been agreed upon. 
Another point that has an impact on the 
future economic development of Afghani-
stan and that has been ignored for quite a 
long time concerns the demographic up-
heaval Afghanistan is facing. According to 
the Population Division of the UN Depart-
ment of Social and Economic Affairs, Af-
ghanistan will have about 47 million in-
habitants by the end of 2024, which is right 
at the end of the “transformation decade.” 
Even a stable and peaceful country would 
face serious challenges if its population 
were to increase from around 32 million 
to 47 million in just 12 years. 
Conclusion 
NATO’s Afghanistan strategy is based on 
assumed developments that, until today, 
have largely not taken place. Regarding the 
operational qualities of the ANSF and the 
governance performance of Karzai’s govern-
ment, the litmus test will be the 2014 presi-
dential elections. If the elections take place 
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and are widely regarded as free, fair, and 
transparent, this will strengthen the insti-
tutions of the Afghan state and boost the 
morale of the ANSF. Conversely, if the elec-
tions are overshadowed by fraud, bribery, 
or violence to an extent that makes voting 
impossible in large parts of the country, the 
Afghan people might ultimately lose their 
faith in the post-2001 political system. 
As regards the peace process and the 
policies of Pakistan and Iran, it is likely 
that the Taleban leadership, as well as the 
relevant power centers in Islamabad and 
Tehran, will await the outcome of the 
presidential elections and wait to see the 
actual level of engagement by NATO and 
the United States after 2014. Whether 
Pakistan and Iran choose a cooperative or 
aggressive approach for their post-2014 
policies depends on whether there is a 
legitimate Afghan government that has 
the power to rule the country and whether 
there is a strong or weak US troop presence 
beyond 2014. Regarding the Taleban in 
particular, it will choose between negotiat-
ing and fighting. 
Remaining options 
As NATO’s ISAF mission will be concluded 
in less than two years and support for the 
war in Afghanistan is continuously dwindl-
ing in Western countries, only a few oppor-
tunities for action remain. Several events 
are considered as game changers that could 
end the current stalemate in Afghanistan. 
These scenarios include Pakistan’s abandon-
ment of its Afghan policy, a substantial 
change in Iran’s approach toward Afghani-
stan, the emergence of a credible and legiti-
mate leader to replace President Karzai, and 
the arrest of the senior Taleban leadership, 
including Mulla Omar. However, NATO and 
the United States should not focus on Paki-
stan and Iran at present. The main obstacles 
for NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan are tied 
to either the Afghan government, repre-
sented by President Karzai, or the Taleban 
and its fabled leader, Mulla Omar. Both 
leaders are strong symbolic figures, which 
the majority of the Afghan people have to 
choose between. 
Having ruled for more than a decade, 
Karzai symbolizes the post-2001 Afghan 
state that has lost a lot of its legitimacy and 
credibility through corruption scandals and 
electoral fraud in recent years. The fact that 
he is the supreme commander of the Af-
ghan forces but seen as weak – even among 
supporters of the new political system – 
partly explains the lack of cohesion and 
the vulnerability to enemy infiltration of 
the ANSF. 
Mulla Omar, who has been on the run 
for about 12 years, is still the undisputed 
spiritual leader of the Taleban movement. 
Nearly all Afghan and foreign insurgent or 
terrorist leaders operating in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan’s tribal areas swore an oath 
to Mulla Omar and regard him as the Amir 
al-Muminin (Commander of the Faithful). 
The mere fact that he has resisted the Amer-
ican superpower for more than a decade 
and is now stalling the United States in the 
negotiations makes him appear strong, 
even in the eyes of those Afghans who do 
not support the Taleban movement. 
Taking away these two symbols – 
through free and transparent elections in 
the case of Karzai, and through arrest in 
the case of Mulla Omar – would change the 
parameters for the external as well as the 
internal players engaging in the Afghan 
game. NATO should concentrate all its 
efforts on supporting the Afghan govern-
ment in the organization of – and the ANSF 
in the protection of – the upcoming elec-
tions, even if this means leaving some 
combat troops in the country after April 5, 
2014. As a last resort, action against the 
senior Taleban leadership – with the ideal 
result of arresting its identity-establishing 
and unifying symbol, Mulla Omar, and 
his key lieutenants – should be taken into 
account. Strengthening the Afghan state 
and its constitution and weakening the 
Taleban are key steps on the way to a dur-
able and stable Afghanistan. 
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